“Freedom is important. When people choose what they want, it’s good for them and for us!”

The above quote is from the former president of Iran from the 90s of the last century, Hashemi Rafsanjani, before his death was called the “great king” of politics in Iran because of his influence on it, said something extremely simple, but at the same time more and more  complicated when it comes to the country in question.

Ebrahim Raisi’s victory in the presidential election embodies, above all, that of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the associated revolutionary institutes in the Islamic Republic. Raisi, a former prosecutor and chief judge of the country’s Supreme Court, is widely seen as Ali Khamenei’s future successor, and the presidential institution as a springboard to the ayatollah’s seat. Ali Khamenei himself was the country’s president in the 1980s during the rule of Islamic Republic founder Ruhollah Khomeini.

And although Raisi lost the previous presidential election in 2017 to incumbent President Hassan Rouhani (by almost 20% or 8 million), this time the mullahs’ regime did not take any risks and paved the way for its favorite to the presidency. This was done through the Board of Trustees, a body whose job description is to assess the suitability of candidates for elective positions as to whether they are doctrinably exemplary under Islamic Republic law. This institute disqualified any candidate who could actually be a competitor to Raisi (from the pragmatically conservative Ali Larijani to the reformer and incumbent Vice President Eshak Jahangiri).

As an attempt to mimic the choice given, the Board of Guardians admitted Abdulnaser Hemati, among several other figures, to the race. Being a technocrat, Hemati is unattractive and relatively unknown; he also became an easy target for the country’s hardliners in the run-up to the election, as Hemati was head of the Central Bank of Iran, which has to do with the devaluation of the local rial. With the technocrat’s admission to the election, the mullahs’ regime did something unique: it designed not only who to win, but also against whom to win their favorite.

Hemati’s participation in the election provided two options for reformers and moderate voters in the country: whether to support him with their vote or not to vote at all. Despite calls from reformers such as Mehdi Karubi and Mohammad Khatami for people to go out and vote, most moderate and reform-minded voters chose to stay home, refusing to legitimize the way the regime censored their electoral options.

There was an outflow of voters in the last parliamentary elections in 2020, when the Board of Trustees also did not allow a number of prominent figures to run for the Mejlis, which is why the hardliners won an easy and convincing victory.

Two things apply to the presidency, which constructs both the executive branch and the Majlis in Iran. One is that they – although not always – serve as a vent for the electorate against the regime, because the principle of these institutions is based on the electoral principle. That is why the presidency of the Islamic Republic was won by candidates who are against the regime’s favorites (such as Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani), and the 2020 Majlis elections edited the current majority of moderates and reformers. The second relevant thing about these institutions, however, is that they do not actually have the kind of power that a presidency (without a prime minister) and a parliament in a republic assume. It is on the basis of the latter that Raisi’s victory in the presidential election will not actually bring about any changes in Iran’s foreign policy. There are three main reasons for this.

Once upon a time, because the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran, Pasdaran, remains the absolute holder in the formation and implementation of the country’s security and foreign policy in the most important regions for Iran (parallel to the fact that Pasdaran is increasingly emerging as a conglomerate with significant economic assets in the country). In protest, although he did not resign, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif resigned two years ago. With President Raisi and the number one diplomat appointed by him, there will be no friction between the country’s foreign ministry and Pasdaran.

Secondly, because Iran’s diplomatic corps is often surrounded by Ayatollah Khamanei’s special envoys (Ali Larijani – for China, Ali Velayati – for Russia; Kamal Harazi – for Germany, etc.).

Third, because important decisions in the country’s foreign policy, including reflecting neighboring departments such as national security and defense, are voted on by the Supreme National Security Council (SJC), in which the foreign minister is only one of 12 (in some cases 13) the member, and the decisions of the SJC shall enter into force after approval by the Ayatollah. However, the President of the country, who has a quota of ministers in this body, is also a voice in the SJC. Therefore, the figure of the president, although not structurally decisive, given that it is blocked by other institutions, the president is not insignificant.

For example, the current Iranian government, led by President Hassan Rouhani, has advocated dialogue with the West and Iran’s economic cooperation with the world. However, Hassan Rouhani’s efforts in these directions were systematically torpedoed by Pasdaran and finally sunk by the US withdrawal from the Nuclear Deal, which led to the resumption of old and the introduction of new sanctions against Tehran. Against this background, Rouhani himself failed to fight for the expansion of civil rights in the country, and the crisis with Kovid – 19 complicated the already complicated by the sanctions situation with the country’s economy.

And this whole set of circumstances has led to widespread frustration among those people in Iran who want to inject them with less ideology and a more decent income. This meant that Ibrahim Raisi could have won this election without relying on the arbitrariness of the revolutionary institutions. Precisely because of the frustration and low mobilization to vote among moderate and reform-oriented voters.

With the victory of Ibrahim Raisi in the presidential election, Ali Khamenei has secured a trusted person to propose the next composition of the government, in which the spaces for points of view other than dogmatic-revolutionary ones will be further narrowed. And in the long run, the main candidate to replace him in the most important position in the country as Iran’s supreme leader. Competitive advantages Raisi’s CV includes things like that he is aware of the regime’s dark secrets (from the seizure of property by people after the 1979 revolution, through his role as a prosecutor in the executions of political prisoners, to the current financial flows around the various religious foundations associated with the ayatollah) and has already been sanctioned by the United States.

Meanwhile, the ayatollah and Pasdaran have lost something convenient for them: the opportunity to blame the moderate government of Rouhani as to blame for any failure of the country’s economic and social systems. Now the mullah regime will have to find another scapegoat.

Neither the appeals from the mosques in Friday prayers nor the television instructions of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei helped. According to preliminary information, the turnout in yesterday’s presidential election in Iran was record low for the standard high in the country (official data will be announced later).